Judgment No 143 of 2024
THIRD GENDER AND GENDER REASSIGNMENT: THE REFERRAL SEEKING TO INTRODUCE A THIRD GENDER IN CIVIL STATUS RECORDS IS INADMISSIBLE; JUDICIAL AUTHORISATION FOR SURGICAL REASSIGNMENT IS UNNECESSARY IF TRANSITION HAS ALREADY OCCURRED
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In Judgment No 143/2024, the Constitutional Court (the “Court”) declared that the question
as to the constitutionality of the binary nature of gender records in the civil status registry is
inadmissible. However, it ruled that the requirement of court authorisation for gender
reassignment surgery is unconstitutional, as it violates the principle of medical self-
determination under Articles 2, 3 and 32 IC.
The binary structure of the civil status registry can affect the fundamental rights of non-binary
people, who cannot have their records corrected so as to reflect their identity. Nevertheless,
introducing a third option would require comprehensive legislative reforms across many
areas of the legal system that can only be accomplished by the legislature. Thus, the
question of constitutionality regarding this aspect of Italian law is deemed inadmissible.
In contrast, the obligation to obtain court authorisation for all cases of gender reassignment
surgery was found to be unreasonable. This requirement unjustifiably hampered an
individual’s right to affirm their gender identity and access necessary medical treatment.
Once a court has confirmed an individual’s transition and granted rectification of gender
records, subsequent reassignment surgeries should only require authorisation from medical
professionals, not judges.
Judgment No 09 of 2024
THE PROVISIONS ON DEFICIT REPAYMENT GRANTING SICILY ADDITIONAL TIME AND MORE LENIENT TERMS CONTRAVENE THE PRINCIPLE OF BUDGET PARITY AND THE UNITY OF THE STATE’S FINANCES
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In Judgment No 9/2024, the Constitutional Court declared that several provisions regarding
the procedure that the Sicily Region must follow to repay its financial deficit are
unconstitutional for breach of Articles 81, 97 and 119 of the Italian Constitution.
Various State and Regional provisions allowed the Sicily Region to plan its deficit repayment
on terms more favourable than those available to all the other regions. Specifically, the Sicily
Region was granted a much longer repayment period and the ability to retroactively modify
its closing statements from previous years, including by authorising new expenses without
financial coverage.
These exceptional terms contradicted the principle of budgetary balance and could not be
justified by the Sicily Region’s special status. On the contrary, they undermined the public
interest in responsible spending and exacerbated the financial situation of both the Region
and, by extension, the State
Judgment No 203 of 2024
THE ORDER TO LEAVE A MUNICIPALITY (FOGLIO DI VIA) DOES NOT LIMIT PERSONAL LIBERTY AND CAN THUS BE ISSUED BY THE POLICE WITHOUT SUBSEQUENT VALIDATION BY A JUDGE
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In Judgment No 203/2024, the Constitutional Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the
statutory measure empowering the chief of police (questore) to issue an order to leave a
municipality (foglio di via) on grounds of public security. The Court found that, on the one
hand, this power does not contravene Article 13 IC, mandating judicial authorisation (or
subsequent validation) of restrictions on personal liberty, and, on the other, it leads to no
arbitrary discrimination contrary to Article 3 IC.
The Court acknowledged that orders to leave a municipality limit freedom of movement and
may interfere with the enjoyment of other fundamental rights by banning access to a specific
place. However, since they impose no positive obligations (e.g., to stay in a certain
municipality), they restrict the freedom of movement without entailing limitations of personal
liberty, which on the contrary require judicial authorisation or validation under Article 13 IC.
Additionally, the Court highlighted that other public security measures – such as police
surveillance or bans on attending sporting events accompanied by an obligation to report to
the police – need judicial authorisation or validation because they impose more severe
limitations of fundamental rights compared to orders to leave a municipality. As a result, the
rationale for requiring judicial authorisation or validation does not apply to orders to leave a
municipality.
Judgment No 135 of 2024
THE COURT CONFIRMS THAT ASSISTED SUICIDE IS ONLY LAWFUL WHEN LIFE- SUSTAINING TREATMENTS ARE IN PLACE AND CLARIFIES THE MEANING OF THIS REQUIREMENT
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In Judgment No 135/2024 the Constitutional Court (the “Court”) held that the defence from
the offence of assisted suicide, introduced in 2019 and applying only when the patient is
kept alive by life-sustaining treatments (Judgment No 242/2019), is not discriminatory or
unreasonable under Article 3 IC, does not infringe a patient’s right to medical self-
determination under Articles 2, 13 and 32 IC, and does not violate Article 117 IC in
connection with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, with respect to patients’ right to private and family
life as well as the prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of this right.
Limiting the application of this defence to cases involving life-sustaining treatments is not
arbitrary. The scope of the defence derives from the right of all patients to refuse any medical
treatments, including life-sustaining ones, a right protected under Article 32 IC and Italian
statutory law. Patients whose survival depends on life-sustaining treatments can decide to
refuse them, and let themselves die; therefore, it would be unreasonable to prevent them
from seeking help from others to terminate their life. The scenario is different for other
patients whose survival does not depend on life-sustaining treatments, since there is no
stand-alone right to commit suicide. Limiting the defence to individuals assisting the first
group of patients does not constitute discrimination in violation of Article 3 IC.
While the principle of medical self-determination must be respected, authorising assisted
suicide at large would impinge on the constitutional value of protecting human life. It is for
the legislature to balance these competing principles and values. The defence for assisted
suicide currently in force strikes this balance in a way that is neither unreasonable nor
disproportionate, as it safeguards vulnerable patients from the consequences of irreversible
decisions that may not be fully deliberated, or may result from undue external pressure. On
these grounds, there is no violation of Articles 2, 13 or 32 IC.
Similarly, the right to private life under the ECHR allows for proportionate restrictions. As the
European Court of Human Rights recognises, States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in
regulating end-of-life procedures, and the Italian legal framework falls within this margin,
thus not violating Article 117 IC in connection with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR.
Judgment No 137 of 2024
THE BAN ON NEW LICENSES FOR PRIVATE HIRE VEHICLES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
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In Judgment No 137/2024, the Constitutional Court (the “Court”) declared that the ban on
issuing new licenses for private hire vehicles (PHV), which was intended to remain in
effect
until an electronic register of transportation service providers became operational, was
unconstitutional and violated Articles 3, 41 and 117 IC, the latter in conjunction with
the
freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU.
More than five years since the adoption of the ban, the register was yet to become
operational, resulting in an indefinite halt to the issuance of much-needed licenses.
This had
irrational, competition-reducing effects. In the context of a scarcity of passenger
transporton-demand services, the prolonged ban harmed consumers and had the sole
tangible effect
of protecting taxi operators, who compete with PHV operators.
On these grounds, the Court declared that the ban was unreasonable and breached Article
3 IC. Additionally, the limitations that the ban imposed on new operators were not
justified
by the pursuit of public interests, and therefore infringed Article 41 IC. Finally, the
ban
hindered the establishment of new operators while favouring existing PHV and taxi
operators, in breach of Article 117 IC, in conjunction with Article 49 TFEU.