Judgment No 7 of 2025
MANDATORY CONFISCATION OF INSTRUMENTALITIES OF CRIME IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT MAY RESULT IN EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
Read the documentRead the Decisions
In Judgment No 7/2025, the Constitutional Court ruled that the mandatory confiscation of
instrumentalities of crime – whether direct or by equivalent means – violated the
principle of proportionality in criminal punishment, as established under Articles 3 and
27(3) of the Italian Constitution, and under Articles 11 and 117 IC, in conjunction with Article
49(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The referral order was deemed admissible, even though the challenged provision could have
been set aside in the main proceedings by directly applying the Charter. Italian courts have
the discretion to either disregard national provisions that conflict with EU law or refer
the matter to the Constitutional Court, requesting that they be declared unconstitutional
and thus removed from the legal system. The latter option has a broader systemic impact
and may be considered preferable by the proceeding court, particularly when fundamental
rights are at stake. This is especially true with regard to criminal provisions, which are
subject, in the Italian legal system, to a strict principle of legality, with a view to ensuring
foreseeability of the application of criminal law, separation of powers between the legislature
and the judiciary, as well as equality of treatment among individuals.
Unlike other forms of confiscation, the confiscation of instrumentalities of crime has a
punitive nature, which requires adherence to the principle of proportionality. However,
since this sanction was mandatory, courts had no discretion to assess whether the
punishment was proportionate to the seriousness of the crime or the financial
circumstances of the offender.
As a result, the automatic enforcement of these fines could lead to disproportionate
outcomes. Consequently, the Court annulled the provisions mandating this form of
confiscation, leaving it open for the legislature to introduce new measures allowing
courts to evaluate the proportionality of confiscation orders.
Judgment No 203 of 2024
THE ORDER TO LEAVE A MUNICIPALITY (FOGLIO DI VIA) DOES NOT LIMIT PERSONAL LIBERTY AND CAN THUS BE ISSUED BY THE POLICE WITHOUT SUBSEQUENT VALIDATION BY A JUDGE
Read the documentRead the Decisions
In Judgment No 203/2024, the Constitutional Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the statutory measure empowering the chief of police (questore) to issue an order to leave a municipality (foglio di via) on grounds of public security. The Court found that, on the one hand, this power does not contravene Article 13 IC, mandating judicial authorisation (or subsequent validation) of restrictions on personal liberty, and, on the other, it leads to no arbitrary discrimination contrary to Article 3 IC.
The Court acknowledged that orders to leave a municipality limit freedom of movement and may interfere with the enjoyment of other fundamental rights by banning access to a specific place. However, since they impose no positive obligations (e.g., to stay in a certain municipality), they restrict the freedom of movement without entailing limitations of personal liberty, which on the contrary require judicial authorisation or validation under Article 13 IC.
Additionally, the Court highlighted that other public security measures – such as police surveillance or bans on attending sporting events accompanied by an obligation to report to the police – need judicial authorisation or validation because they impose more severe limitations of fundamental rights compared to orders to leave a municipality. As a result, the rationale for requiring judicial authorisation or validation does not apply to orders to leave a municipality.
Judgment No 143 of 2024
THIRD GENDER AND GENDER REASSIGNMENT: THE REFERRAL SEEKING TO INTRODUCE A THIRD GENDER IN CIVIL STATUS RECORDS IS INADMISSIBLE; JUDICIAL AUTHORISATION FOR SURGICAL REASSIGNMENT IS UNNECESSARY IF TRANSITION HAS ALREADY OCCURRED
Read the document
In Judgment No 143/2024, the Constitutional Court (the "Court") declared that the question as to the constitutionality of the binary nature of gender records in the civil status registry is inadmissible. However, it ruled that the requirement of court authorisation for gender reassignment surgery is unconstitutional, as it violates the principle of medical self-determination under Articles 2, 3 and 32 IC.
The binary structure of the civil status registry can affect the fundamental rights of non-binary people, who cannot have their records corrected so as to reflect their identity. Nevertheless, introducing a third option would require comprehensive legislative reforms across many areas of the legal system that can only be accomplished by the legislature. Thus, the question of constitutionality regarding this aspect of Italian law is deemed inadmissible.
In contrast, the obligation to obtain court authorisation for all cases of gender reassignment surgery was found to be unreasonable. This requirement unjustifiably hampered an individual's right to affirm their gender identity and access necessary medical treatment. Once a court has confirmed an individual's transition and granted rectification of gender records, subsequent reassignment surgeries should only require authorisation from medical professionals, not judges.
Judgment No 137 of 2024
THE BAN ON NEW LICENSES FOR PRIVATE HIRE VEHICLES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Read the document
In Judgment No 137/2024, the Constitutional Court (the "Court") declared that the ban on issuing new licenses for private hire vehicles (PHV), which was intended to remain in effect until an electronic register of transportation service providers became operational, was unconstitutional and violated Articles 3, 41 and 117 IC, the latter in conjunction with the freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU.
More than five years since the adoption of the ban, the register was yet to become operational, resulting in an indefinite halt to the issuance of much-needed licenses. This had irrational, competition-reducing effects. In the context of a scarcity of passenger transporton-demand services, the prolonged ban harmed consumers and had the sole tangible effect of protecting taxi operators, who compete with PHV operators.
On these grounds, the Court declared that the ban was unreasonable and breached Article 3 IC. Additionally, the limitations that the ban imposed on new operators were not justified by the pursuit of public interests, and therefore infringed Article 41 IC. Finally, the ban hindered the establishment of new operators while favouring existing PHV and taxi operators, in breach of Article 117 IC, in conjunction with Article 49 TFEU.
Judgment No 135 of 2024
THE COURT CONFIRMS THAT ASSISTED SUICIDE IS ONLY LAWFUL WHEN LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENTS ARE IN PLACE AND CLARIFIES THE MEANING OF THIS REQUIREMENT
Read the documentRead the Decisions
In Judgment No 135/2024 the Constitutional Court (the "Court") held that the defence from the offence of assisted suicide, introduced in 2019 and applying only when the patient is kept alive by life-sustaining treatments (Judgment No 242/2019), is not discriminatory or unreasonable under Article 3 IC, does not infringe a patient's right to medical self-determination under Articles 2, 13 and 32 IC, and does not violate Article 117 IC in connection with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, with respect to patients' right to private and family life as well as the prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of this right.
Limiting the application of this defence to cases involving life-sustaining treatments is not arbitrary. The scope of the defence derives from the right of all patients to refuse any medical treatments, including life-sustaining ones, a right protected under Article 32 IC and Italian statutory law. Patients whose survival depends on life-sustaining treatments can decide to refuse them, and let themselves die; therefore, it would be unreasonable to prevent them from seeking help from others to terminate their life. The scenario is different for other patients whose survival does not depend on life-sustaining treatments, since there is no stand-alone right to commit suicide. Limiting the defence to individuals assisting the first group of patients does not constitute discrimination in violation of Article 3 IC.
While the principle of medical self-determination must be respected, authorising assisted suicide at large would impinge on the constitutional value of protecting human life. It is for the legislature to balance these competing principles and values. The defence for assisted suicide currently in force strikes this balance in a way that is neither unreasonable nor disproportionate, as it safeguards vulnerable patients from the consequences of irreversible decisions that may not be fully deliberated, or may result from undue external pressure. On these grounds, there is no violation of Articles 2, 13 or 32 IC.
Similarly, the right to private life under the ECHR allows for proportionate restrictions. As the European Court of Human Rights recognises, States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in regulating end-of-life procedures, and the Italian legal framework falls within this margin, thus not violating Article 117 IC in connection with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR.
Judgment No 41 of 2024
“DURING PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION SUSPECTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO WAIVE A TIME-BAR IN ORDER TO SEEK FULL ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
Read the document
In Judgment No 41/2024, the Constitutional Court ruled that suspects under criminal
investigation have no right to be informed of the termination of the proceedings due to a
time-bar, even if this prevents them from waiving the time-bar in order to seek full acquittal
at trial. The absence of this right does not violate the suspect’s rights to defence and
adversarial proceedings, guaranteed under Articles 24 and 111 IC.
The Court noted that the right to waive a time-bar must be ensured to individuals seeking to
have their innocence formally declared by judgment. However, the termination of
proceedings due to a time-bar is a neutral act that does not imply that the suspect has been
found guilty and, therefore, does not affect their reputation.
The right to be informed is granted to suspects when proceedings are terminated during the
investigation due to the triviality of the offence because the termination order implicitly finds
that a crime has been committed. In these instances, the suspect must have the opportunity
to waive the time-bar and defend themselves in trial. Similarly, at the trial stage, defendants
may waive a time-bar to seek full acquittal. However, the situation differs for investigations
terminated due to time-bar, as these cases involve no finding of guilt and end before the trial
begins. Therefore, no discrimination in violation of Article 3 IC occurs.
However, when prosecutors, in their request for termination due to a time-bar, include undue
remarks on the merits of the charges, the request ceases to be a neutral act and violates
the presumption of innocence. In such cases, the suspects must be provided with an
effective remedy for this violation.
Judgment No 41 of 2024
“DURING PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION SUSPECTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO WAIVE A TIME-BAR IN ORDER TO SEEK FULL ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
Read the document
In Judgment No 41/2024, the Constitutional Court ruled that suspects under criminal
investigation have no right to be informed of the termination of the proceedings due to a
time-bar, even if this prevents them from waiving the time-bar in order to seek full acquittal
at trial. The absence of this right does not violate the suspect’s rights to defence and
adversarial proceedings, guaranteed under Articles 24 and 111 IC.
The Court noted that the right to waive a time-bar must be ensured to individuals seeking to
have their innocence formally declared by judgment. However, the termination of
proceedings due to a time-bar is a neutral act that does not imply that the suspect has been
found guilty and, therefore, does not affect their reputation.
The right to be informed is granted to suspects when proceedings are terminated during the
investigation due to the triviality of the offence because the termination order implicitly finds
that a crime has been committed. In these instances, the suspect must have the opportunity
to waive the time-bar and defend themselves in trial. Similarly, at the trial stage, defendants
may waive a time-bar to seek full acquittal. However, the situation differs for investigations
terminated due to time-bar, as these cases involve no finding of guilt and end before the trial
begins. Therefore, no discrimination in violation of Article 3 IC occurs.
However, when prosecutors, in their request for termination due to a time-bar, include undue
remarks on the merits of the charges, the request ceases to be a neutral act and violates
the presumption of innocence. In such cases, the suspects must be provided with an
effective remedy for this violation.
Judgment No 9 of 2024
THE PROVISIONS ON DEFICIT REPAYMENT GRANTING SICILY ADDITIONAL TIME AND MORE LENIENT TERMS CONTRAVENE THE PRINCIPLE OF BUDGET PARITY AND THE UNITY OF THE STATE'S FINANCES
Read the document
In Judgment No 9/2024, the Constitutional Court declared that several provisions regarding the procedure that the Sicily Region must follow to repay its financial deficit are unconstitutional for breach of Articles 81, 97 and 119 of the Italian Constitution.
Various State and Regional provisions allowed the Sicily Region to plan its deficit repayment on terms more favourable than those available to all the other regions. Specifically, the Sicily Region was granted a much longer repayment period and the ability to retroactively modify its closing statements from previous years, including by authorising new expenses without financial coverage.
These exceptional terms contradicted the principle of budgetary balance and could not be justified by the Sicily Region's special status. On the contrary, they undermined the public interest in responsible spending and exacerbated the financial situation of both the Region and, by extension, the State